The changing colours of the post-communist state: The politicisation of the senior civil service in Hungary

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Abstract. This article examines claims that senior civil services in post-communist Europe are subject to instability and politicisation, and that both features are at the centre of what amounts to the emergence of a distinct type of executive governance different from Western traditions. At the conceptual level, the article develops four modes of politicisation that differ with respect to the political control over the making and breaking of bureaucratic careers. Modes of politicisation serve as an analytical tool to assess and classify the politicisation of post-communist senior civil services and to compare them to prevailing modes of politicisation in Western democracies as well as the communist past. At the empirical level, the article examines the politicisation of the senior civil service in post-communist Hungary. It argues that the politicisation of the Hungarian senior civil service is characterised by high turnover, recruitment of outsiders and heavy reliance on the appointment of officials who come and go with their bloc of political parties while bridging the out-of-office period in the private sector, academia or at a political party. The article concludes that the politicisation of the senior civil service in post-communist Hungary has more in common with the communist past than with the prevailing modes of politicisation in Western democracies. The main difference from the communist era lies in the periodically changing political colours of the post-communist state.

Introduction

Research in comparative public administration has shown a renewed interest in the relation between politics and administration in Western democracies (Page & Wright 1999; Rhodes & Weller 2001; Peters & Pierre 2001, 2004). Far less is known about the emerging relations between politics and administration in the new democracies of post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. Initial research on executive developments in post-communist Europe has found that, at the central government level, politico-administrative relations are characterised by ‘instability’ and ‘politicalisation’. Verheijen & Rabrenovic (2001: 441), for instance, argue that: ‘The prevailing pattern in [post-communist] states is still one of the top echelons of the civil service changing with each election, or, in worse cases, government reshuffles.’ Similarly, Goetz & Wollmann (2001: 880) observe a ‘persistent influence of party politics in the management of personnel
policy’ and the tendency of ministers to ‘surround themselves with entourages of political advisors’. While acknowledging that politicisation is widespread in Western democracies, Goetz & Margetts (1999) and Goetz & Wollmann (2001) contend that the nature of politicisation of post-communist senior civil services is at the centre of what may amount to the emergence of a ‘new administrative type’ and a ‘distinct pattern of post-communist executive governance’ significantly differing from Western traditions. So far, however, comparative studies of executives have examined neither the extent to which senior civil services in post-communist Europe have been subject to instability and politicisation, nor the extent to which the politicisation of personnel policy differs from the Western experience of politicisation.

Concentrating on the case of Hungary in comparative perspective, this article argues that there are indeed signs of difference between the politicisation of post-communist senior civil services and the prevailing modes of politicisation in Western democracies. First, by international standards, personnel turnover is very high, in that changes of government trigger almost a complete substitution of personnel in the senior ranks of the ministerial bureaucracy. Second, over time, governments increasingly have recruited new appointees from outside the ministerial bureaucracy, including political office, rather than the ministerial civil service. Third, the most common path to the top has become the commuting between the ministerial bureaucracy, the wider public administration, academia, the private sector and political parties. In particular, governments appoint officials who are ‘returnees’ in the sense that they work in senior administrative ranks under governments of the same political couleur, leave when a government is formed by parties of the opposite political spectrum, but return to senior ranks with ‘their bloc of parties’ after having bridged the out-of-office period in the private sector, academia or at a political party.

Most of these features of politicisation are not unknown in Western democracies. Personnel turnover after changes of government is high in many Western European countries. The recruitment of outsiders is relatively less important for Western Europe, but it is a central feature of the politicisation of the bureaucracy in the United States. By contrast, high turnover in combination with the heavy reliance on the appointment of returnees to senior civil service positions is untypical in Western democracies. This article therefore concludes that it is justified to speak about the emergence of a mode of senior civil service politicisation that differs from the Western mainstream. More specifically, it argues that the governance of the senior ranks of the ministerial bureaucracy looks quite familiar to students of communist one-party states, the difference being that the post-communist state changes its political colour every few years.

The development of the argument is divided into conceptual and empirical parts. The former develops four modes of politicisation as a conceptual map for
the assessment and classification of politicisation in post-communist executives. Modes of politicisation take into account the various Western traditions as well as the main features of politicisation under the communist regime. The modes are constructed to provide a framework for the comparison of politicisation in post-communist settings and in Western democracies. The empirical part examines in more detail the politicisation of the senior civil service in post-communist Hungary. It assesses the impact of government changes on turnover in the senior ranks of the ministerial bureaucracy and analyses the career pathways of new appointees. The conclusion explores the extent to which the Hungarian trajectory of politicisation applies to Central and Eastern European senior civil services more generally. In addition, it discusses the wider implications of the findings for the governance of the post-communist state and for research in the areas of comparative public administration and comparative politics.

What mode of politicisation for post-communist senior civil services?

The politicisation of public administration, in particular its personnel, was a key feature of the communist administration (König 1992; Scherpereel 2004). The senior ranks of the ministerial bureaucracy belonged to the nomenclature list of the communist system, and the intertwining of political and administrative careers under the control of the ruling communist party was a central element of politicisation during the communist regime (Gazsó 1992). The appointment of senior officials was subject to the discretion and approval of the ruling communist party, political and ideological reliability remained a necessary condition for selection until the final days of the communist regime, and appointees were effectively required to be party members (Balázs 1993; Csanádi 1997). Senior officials’ career paths did not merely involve a gradual rising through the ranks of the bureaucratic hierarchy. Instead, a common feature of the nomenclature system was the interweaving of individual career paths in the party, the state administration and the economy (Kornai 1992; Lőrincz 1983). Before reaching the senior ranks of the ministerial bureaucracy, officials commonly had gained experience in the headquarters of the ruling communist party and, subsequently, their careers could progress to posts in government, the economy or organisations outside the core structure of the state.

The end of communist rule and the introduction of multiparty democracy inevitably brought this mode of politicisation to an end. The abolition of the power monopoly of the communist party, the privatisation of state assets and the disentanglement of the state, the party and societal organisations such as trade unions implied that a single party in government could no longer control
bureaucratic career paths in as encompassing a way as the communist party had done before the change of regime. Above all, the prospect of alternation of political parties in government ‘broke’ the continuous nature of political control over bureaucratic career pathways by one party in that newly formed parties could gain access to government office. A new mode of personnel politicisation therefore had to take root in Central and Eastern Europe after the change of regime to democracy, but it was less clear what the characteristic features of this mode of politicisation and its implications for the stability of the senior civil service would be.

Studies of politicisation commonly direct attention to the social background of senior officials, the role behaviour of senior officials and the political control of senior civil service careers (in particular, the repercussions of government changes on the composition of the senior bureaucracy). Concentrating in this article on the latter strand of inquiry, the recent literature on politician-bureaucrat relations in Western democracies suggests that the politicisation of personnel policy is widespread, that the modes, the degree and the depth of politicisation differ across countries and time, and that the virtual absence of political intervention into civil service affairs, as in the United Kingdom, is an exception (Page & Wright 1999; Peters & Pierre 2004).

Rather than assessing the politicisation of post-communist senior civil services against the many real world modes of politicisation, this article develops four ideal modes for comparative analysis of politicisation in Western democracies and in post-communist Europe. It takes as a starting point the options that new governments have when choosing an approach to the political control of senior bureaucrats after a change of government. First, assuming that the legal basis of personnel policy permits, any new government has to decide whether or not to terminate the careers of officials who have already served an outgoing government. Second, if it chooses to terminate the careers of such inherited officials, it has to further decide from what setting to recruit new appointees for senior positions. These settings range from the ministerial bureaucracy to executive agencies, academia, the private sector, interest groups, political parties and many others, but as will be seen below, they can be grouped into different kinds of recruitment pools yielding officials with different kinds of career backgrounds. Combining these options, the remainder of this part of the article distinguishes four modes of politicisation that differ along these two dimensions of the political control of bureaucratic careers: the approach of new government politicians to the making and breaking of the careers of officials who nominally occupy senior civil service positions.

The first mode is a Weberian perspective on bureaucratic governance and political change. It suggests a mode of *de facto* non-politicisation. New governments do not replace senior officials inherited from an outgoing government.
and, to the extent that vacancies arise, these vacancies are filled from within by promoting officials from lower ranks into senior positions based on criteria of professional competence without political interference. This approach to political control results from Weber’s (1980) argument that bureaucratic officials are indispensable in that the members of a new government will find it impossible to govern the state and the country without relying on the technical and procedural expertise (Fach- and Dienstwissen) of officials inherited from an outgoing government or, if the change of government is embedded in a change of regime, the former regime (see also Wilson 1993). The paradox of this perspective is that it would involve stability in terms of senior personnel, but it would represent a fundamental departure from the communist mode of politicisation. Bureaucratic careers would be separate from political careers, and when post-communist politicians take office after a change of government, they would effectively refrain from directly exercising political control over bureaucratic careers. Post-communist politicians would thus rely on the ‘political neutrality of the senior civil service’. Page & Wright (1999) identify this approach to the political control of the senior civil service for Western European countries such as the United Kingdom.

The other three modes of politicisation imply that the senior ranks of the administration are subject to major politically motivated change. Wilson (1993) argues that after a change of regime, new governments have good reason to question the reliability of inherited senior officials because their careers inevitably are associated with the former regime. Wilson (1993) further argues that the difference between a change of government and a change of regime is effectively a matter of degree in that a change of government that is embedded in a change of regime simply reinforces a potential problem of political responsiveness of inherited officials for the members of a new government. In order to address problems of political responsiveness, new governments can choose to break the careers of inherited senior officials. Dismissing inherited senior officials does, however, raise the question of who will take their posts. Three modes of politicisation can be derived from this perspective. They differ with respect to the career background of officials who are appointed to senior positions.

The second mode, ‘bounded politicisation’, assumes that new governments replace inherited senior officials and fill these vacancies by promoting lower-ranking officials into senior ranks. By replacing the inherited senior officials and selectively promoting lower-ranking officials, the new political leadership addresses a potential lack of political responsiveness. At the same time, the political leadership takes advantage of the competence of officials who have already worked in the administration. The politicisation of the senior civil service is therefore ‘channelled’ or ‘bounded’ in that the political control over
bureaucratic careers remains internal to the civil service. Moreover, it politi-
cises the promotion of senior civil servants, but does not upset the career
advancement from the lower to the senior ranks of the ministerial bureau-
cracy. This mode of politicisation is modelled on the ‘commanding heights
approach to political control’, which Page & Wright (1999) identify for coun-
tries such as Germany and France.

A third mode of ‘open politicisation’ assumes that new governments
replace inherited senior officials and fill these vacancies by appointing officials
who are recruited from settings other than the ministerial bureaucracy, includ-
ing organs of public administration that are outside the core structure of the
ministries, the private sector, academia, nongovernmental organisations or
interest groups. In this case, new governments terminate careers of inherited
officials, but recruit new officials from non-ministerial settings. More impor-
tantly, the careers of senior officials and the careers of lower-ranking officials
are no longer connected. Senior ranks commonly cannot be reached by rising
through the ranks of the ministries, but are reached from outside the minis-
tries. The top of the ministerial bureaucracy is therefore essentially open and
staffing relies on the influx of outsiders to senior ranks. The literature on
comparative public administration suggests that this mode of politicisation is
well known, but less typical in Western Europe. By contrast, the literature on
American bureaucracy suggests that the recruitment of outsiders is a very
common path to the top positions designated for political appointment (Heclo

Finally, we can distinguish a fourth mode of ‘partisan politicisation’. It
assumes that, again, new governments replace senior officials, but they fill these
vacancies by appointing officials whose careers involve experience in political
settings such as government posts, parliament, political parties and organisa-
tions in the wider periphery of the governing parties. Political leaders, there-
fore, not only intervene into bureaucratic careers, but bureaucratic and
political careers are intertwined and hardly distinguishable, while the direct
career nexus between the lower and the senior ranks of the civil service is
again separated. This mode of politicisation also creates a paradox of change in
that the change of regime produces major changes in the composition of the
senior bureaucracy, but presents much less of a break with the mode of politi-
cisation familiar from the communist administration. A political background is
again a requirement for an appointment to senior positions in the ministerial
bureaucracy and may become an important component of what is in fact a
political career, subsequently, leading to senior party posts and senior posts in
government such as an appointment as cabinet minister. Serving as a partisan
civil servant may thus be an important opportunity to acquire ‘governmental
craft’. Analogous to Goetz’ (1997) civil servants who acquire ‘political craft’ in
policy coordination units close to political power, governmental craft can be understood as a useful ingredient of politicians’ careers in that it allows them to gain skills that are relevant for the management of government departments at a later stage of their career. While it is not unusual for Western democracies to find civil servants who turn politician, notably in France (Rouban 1999), it is less common for political officeholders to be appointed to posts that are nominally part of the senior civil service.

These four modes of politicisation provide a flexible analytical tool for the classification of different approaches that politicians can take to the political control of bureaucratic careers (see Table 1). They can be applied to compare the politicisation of the senior bureaucracy in different geographical settings and they can be used to examine different periods of time as well as different ranks within the bureaucracy. In the empirical world, it is very likely that different modes of politicisation co-exist, but it can be expected that one of the modes is the prevailing mode of politicisation for a particular country during a particular period of time. Most importantly, the four modes of politicisation provide a starting point for the assessment of differences and similarities between the politicisation of senior civil services in Western democracies and in post-communist Europe. They therefore provide important clues with respect to the claim that post-communist transformation might have led to the emergence of a ‘new administrative type’ different from Western traditions (Goetz 2001; Goetz & Margetts 1999). The mode of de facto non-politicisation and the mode of bounded politicisation can accommodate the broad approaches to the political control of senior civil services in Western Europe. It may be argued that especially the category of bounded politicisation is too broad and cannot capture the differences among countries such as Germany, Austria and Spain unless one explicitly accounts for the depth and degree of a particular mode of politicisation. Like every classification, this one also represents a simplification of the universe of real world modes of politicisation, but it can be argued that for the present purpose two categories are sufficient to indicate a broad correspondence between the politicisation of post-communist senior civil services and Western European modes of politicisation.

By contrast, the mode of open politicisation would point to differences between the Western European traditions and the new democracies of post-communist Europe as suggested by Goetz and colleagues. Open politicisation in Central and Eastern Europe would indicate broad similarities with the American experience of politicisation, which would raise interesting questions with respect to the emergence of similar modes of politicisation in otherwise very different settings. Finally, the mode of partisan politicisation is generally unusual in Western democracies. Partisan politicisation would indicate the emergence of some new mode of politicisation in post-communist Europe.
Table 1. Four modes of politicisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Politicisation</th>
<th>Non-politicisation</th>
<th>Bounded Politicisation</th>
<th>Open Politicisation</th>
<th>Partisan Politicisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The approach of new governments towards inherited senior officials</td>
<td>Do not replace</td>
<td>Replace</td>
<td>Replace</td>
<td>Replace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The career path of new appointees</td>
<td>Recruit career officials from the ministerial bureaucracy</td>
<td>Recruit career officials from the ministerial bureaucracy</td>
<td>Recruit outsiders from non-political settings</td>
<td>Recruit outsiders from political settings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
because it differs both from the Western traditions of politicisation and from the communist past. However, the centrality assigned to close control of what is nominally a bureaucratic career by political parties, and in particular the blurring of differences between political and bureaucratic career paths, suggests that the post-communist practice of politicisation has not departed fundamentally from the communist past, but reflects an adaptation of the communist mode of politicisation to democratic conditions.

The remainder of this article examines the politicisation of the senior civil service in post-communist Hungary. Given the present stage of research on the relations between politicians and bureaucrats in Central and Eastern Europe, it adopts a case study design to investigate the politicisation of the senior civil service in one country in depth across time and across ranks in order to set the scene for broader cross-national research in the future (George & Bennett 2005; Gerring 2004). If the case study shows that the politicisation of the Hungarian senior civil service differs from the prevailing Western modes of politicisation, then the argument in favour of the emergence of a new, post-communist type of executive governance gains strong support in that at least one – from the perspective of Western modes of politicisation – deviant case has been identified and subsequently can be made subject to explanation. Future research will then have to show the extent to which the findings of the this article can be generalised beyond the Hungarian case.

The case of Hungary has been chosen here as a ‘most-likely-case’ for the emergence of some Western mode of politicisation in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary belongs to the group of countries that was identified early as being most eager to follow Western examples in the areas of governance and public policy (Rose 1993). In particular, it is commonly argued that, among the ‘over-politicised’ personnel systems of the communist era (Goetz & Wollmann 2001), Hungary’s state bureaucracy was relatively more professionalised than the bureaucracies of other countries (Balázs 1993; Kitschelt et al 1999). Moreover, Hungary is widely cited as the ‘frontrunner’ in the area of civil service reform (Dimitrova 2005; Meyer-Sahling 2004). It can therefore reasonably be assumed that Hungary has had the most favourable conditions for the emergence of a Western mode of politicisation in post-communist Europe.

Towards partisan politicisation: Senior civil service politicisation in post-communist Hungary

The analysis of modes of politicisation in post-communist Hungary concentrates on the top two ranks of the senior civil service. From 1990–2006, these
were Administrative and Deputy State Secretaries. Since 2006, they are labelled ‘Senior State Secretaries’ and ‘Specialist State Secretaries’. Similar to politische Beamte in Germany and directeurs d’administration in France, the appointment and dismissal of State Secretaries in Hungary are subject to the discretion of the government of the day. From a formal-legal point of view, the political control of State Secretaries’ careers may give rise to any of the four modes of politicisation developed above.5 Governments may dismiss State Secretaries at any time, and they may promote ministerial career civil servants to State Secretary ranks, appoint outsiders or recruit political and party office-holders to the apex of the ministerial bureaucracy – the qualification being that political and partisan recruits are required to resign from their political posts upon appointment to a State Secretary position.6

The mode of senior civil service politicisation that has evolved in Hungary since the change of regime is characterised by three features. First, changes of government produce almost a complete substitution of the State Secretaries that an incoming government inherits from its predecessor. In accordance with Verheijen & Rabrenovic’ (2001) statement quoted in the introduction to this article, instability is a central feature of the Hungarian senior civil service. Second, by the end of the first decade after the change of regime, career civil servants had become a tiny minority in the State Secretary ranks. Governments recruit most of the new appointees from outside the ministerial bureaucracy, including from political offices. Third, governments appoint State Secretaries who are ‘returnees’. Returnees are officials who work in senior administrative ranks under governments of the same political couleur, leave when a government is formed by parties of the opposite political persuasion, but return to State Secretary ranks with ‘their bloc of parties’ after having bridged the out-of-office period in the private sector, academia or at a political party. In other words, governments do not necessarily recruit State Secretaries from different kinds of political offices, but the career pathways of government politicians and State Secretaries overlap closely in that governments rely on experienced officials whose careers are tied to the electoral fortune of the governing parties. Moreover, by heavily relying on returnees, governing parties reveal that they prefer to appoint officials who have a proven track record of serving governments formed by parties of the same or similar political convictions.

Insofar as the politicisation of State Secretaries in post-communist Hungary is concerned, this article thus argues that the nature of political control over bureaucratic careers comes closest to a mode of partisan politicisation. The deviation from this approach to senior personnel policy concerns the first freely elected government led by Prime Minister Antall (see Table 2). When taking office in 1990, the Antall Government replaced an overwhelming
majority of top officials inherited from the last socialist government, but most of the newly appointed State Secretaries had pursued careers in the ministerial bureaucracy during the communist regime. This initially friendly take-over of the senior bureaucracy was a short-lived phenomenon, however, as the Antall Government soon turned to a more assertive approach to political control. Hungary's senior civil service has thus undergone a re-politicisation from a mode of bounded politicisation in the early days after the change of regime towards a mode of partisan politicisation since the second national elections of 1994.7

The remainder of this part of the article first examines in more detail the approach of incoming governments to State Secretaries inherited from their predecessors in government. It then discusses the recruitment and career pathways of State Secretaries. The analysis is based on data collected for the period 1990–2000. During this time, Hungary held three national elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period in office</th>
<th>Governing parties</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christian Democratic People’s Party, KDNP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994–1998</td>
<td>Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP</td>
<td>Gyula Horn, MSZP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent Smallholder Party, FKGP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungarian Democratic Forum, MDF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 2002</td>
<td>Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP</td>
<td>Péter Medgyessy, MSZP**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ</td>
<td>Ferenc Gyuresánya, MSZP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * From 1995 until 2003 the official name of the Fidesz was Alliance of Young Democrats–Hungarian Civic Party, Fidesz-MPP. Since 2003, the official name of the party is Alliance of Young Democrats–Hungarian Civil Movement, Fidesz-MPSZ. Following common usage, the discussion will use the label ‘Fidesz’ only. ** Medgyessy was nominated by the MSZP, but he was not member of the party.
(1990, 1994 and 1998), each of which led to a wholesale change of government (see Table 2). The developments since the beginning of 2001, including the impact of the change of government in 2002, are addressed in the final part of the discussion. They support the conclusions reached for the first decade after the change of regime.

The analysis relies on data gathered from Hungarian Political Yearbooks that are published annually (Kurtan et al. 1989–2001) and the Government Almanacs of the first and second governments (Kajdi et al. 1994; Kiss et al. 1998). Both of these sources contain the parent ministry of State Secretaries and their dates of appointment and dismissal. The Government Almanacs further contain short single-page curriculum vitae of State Secretaries and members of the government of the first two governments, which have been used to investigate governments’ recruitment strategies and State Secretaries’ career paths. The data have been complemented with information from the Public Administration Almanacs of 1996 and 2000, which provide basic career information of most personnel in managing ranks who were employed in public administration in the respective years (Kiss et al. 1997; Stumpf & Bártfai 1999). The analysis of the Orbán Government was conducted on the basis of sample data, while it was possible to gather data for almost the entire population of State Secretaries who were appointed before July 1998. Finally, between June 2000 and September 2002, the author conducted approximately 40 interviews with Members of Parliament, Ministers and State Secretaries in Hungary.

Confronting old bureaucrats: Changes of governments and turnover among State Secretaries

The three changes of government of 1990, 1994 and 1998 produced almost a complete substitution of personnel in State Secretary ranks. Tables 3 and 4 show the effective turnover among State Secretaries after new governments took office. The Antall Government initiated the largest turnover by retaining only six out of 74 officials who were appointed to more or less similar top positions during the final days of the Németh Government. Before the change of regime, Hungarian ministries were headed by a Minister, one or two State Secretaries and three to eight Deputy Ministers. When the Temporary Act on State Secretaries was adopted in 1990 shortly before the investiture of the Antall Government, all State Secretaries and Deputy Ministers were formally dismissed and all Administrative and Deputy State Secretaries were newly appointed. In effect, the Act transformed the rank of Deputy Minister into the rank of Deputy State Secretary, while splitting the State Secretary rank into one Administrative State Secretary per ministry and one Political State Sec-
Secretary who assists the Minister in the political leadership of the ministry (Meyer-Sahling 2001). There is thus no direct equivalence in ranks between pre-1990 State Secretaries and Deputy Ministers, on the one hand, and Administrative and Deputy State Secretaries, on the other. However, following conventional wisdom in Hungary, Tables 3 and 4 depict the effective turnover in the top two ranks after the formation of the first government in 1990.

Both changes of government in 1994 and 1998 were again followed by a major turnover among State Secretaries. The Horn Government replaced almost 50 per cent of all inherited State Secretaries within three months after taking office and, by the spring of 1998, more than 75 per cent of all inherited State Secretaries had left their posts. When the Orbán Government took office in 1998, almost 60 per cent of the inherited State Secretaries were replaced within three months and 85 per cent had left their posts by the end of 2000.

Table 3. Replacement of inherited State Secretaries after changes of government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Antall</th>
<th></th>
<th>Horn</th>
<th></th>
<th>Orbán</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replaced within</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 months</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>67.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>72.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full term</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>58*</td>
<td>85.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not replaced</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * The figures for the Orbán government refer to the number/proportion of replacements that had occurred by 31 December 2000.

Table 4. Replacement of Administrative and Deputy State Secretaries within six months after changes of government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Antall</th>
<th></th>
<th>Horn</th>
<th></th>
<th>Orbán</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative State</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretaries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replaced</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not replaced</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy State Secretaries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replaced</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not replaced</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, Table 4 distinguishes the turnover between Administrative and Deputy State Secretaries within six months after a change of government. It shows that Administrative State Secretaries had a lower chance of surviving a change of government than Deputy State Secretaries.

Proximity to changes in the partisan composition of governments can be taken to indicate that the departure of State Secretaries was politically motivated. Studies of the politicisation of senior civil services in Western Europe usually take six to twelve months after a change of government as a cut-off point to distinguish whether or not personnel changes are politically motivated (Derlien 1988; Parrado-Díez 2004). By this measure, the timing of the turnover in Hungary indicates that new governments have used their political discretion to terminate the careers of inherited State Secretaries. To the extent that comparable data are available, the evidence suggests that Hungary can be classified in the category of countries that experience high turnover among senior civil servants after a change of government. For instance, after the wholesale change of government in 1998 in Germany, 52 per cent of the politische Beamte appointed to the top two ranks of the federal bureaucracy were replaced, and the changes of government in Spain in 1982 and 1996 produced turnover among top officials of the ministerial bureaucracy of 76 and 89 per cent, respectively (Derlien 2003; Parrado-Díez 2004).

High turnover among inherited State Secretaries after changes of government also has implications for the mode of senior civil service politicisation in Hungary. Regardless of the recruitment strategies of successive governments, the politically motivated departure of a large proportion of State Secretaries means that a mode of de facto non-politicisation can be excluded for post-communist Hungary. The next section briefly introduces the population of newly appointed State Secretaries and then examines more closely the career pathways of these new appointees in order to determine which of the three alternative modes of politicisation can be identified since the change of regime.

Re-colouring the top: Changes of government and the appointment of State Secretaries

While 178 inherited State Secretaries were dismissed between 1990 and the end of 2000, 308 State Secretaries were effectively newly appointed in the same period. This does not mean that the number of State Secretary posts at the central government level grew by more than two-thirds during the period under study, although the number of available State Secretary positions did indeed increase. Every ministry is usually headed by one Administrative State Secretary (now one Senior State Secretary) as the professional head of the
ministerial organisation, which implies that the number of Administrative State Secretaries appointed at any point in time varied between 13 during the Horn Government and 15 during the Orbán Government. By contrast, the number of Deputy State Secretaries (now Specialist State Secretaries) increased from three or four per ministry during the Antall Government (average 3.2 per ministry) to between three and six during the Orbán Government (average 4.3 per ministry). The large number of State Secretaries formally registered as new appointments is therefore the result of the premature dismissal of State Secretaries by the government that appointed them in the first place (Table 5). I therefore distinguish State Secretaries that were appointed within six months after a change of government as the ‘first generation’ of appointees. Subsequently, ‘second-generation State Secretaries’ were most likely to fill a vacancy left by a first-generation appointee or even by a fellow second-generation appointee (Table 6). Instability among State Secretaries was not restricted to the periods after a change of government, but persisted throughout the government’s term in office (similarly, Szente 1999). The irony is that the tenure of nominally professional, permanent civil servants was therefore only slightly longer than that of their political masters. Administrative and Deputy State Secretaries stayed in office for an average of 24.1

**Table 5.** Number of new appointments after changes of government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Antall</th>
<th>Horn</th>
<th>Orbán</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative State Secretaries</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy State Secretaries</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All State Secretaries</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6.** First and second generation appointments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Antall</th>
<th>Horn</th>
<th>Orbán</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative State Secretaries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First generation (≤ 6 months)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second generation (&gt; 6 months)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy State Secretaries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First generation (≤ 6 months)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second generation (&gt; 6 months)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and 26.4 months, respectively, while Ministers’ duration in office stands at 23.6 months for the same period from 1990 until the end of 2000.

In contrast to the broad similarities of the turnover patterns for all three governments, the recruitment strategies changed considerably during the first decade after the change of regime. Table 7 reports the last position or the last job held by newly appointed State Secretaries. According to this measurement, the largest proportion was recruited from outside the ministerial bureaucracy (47.8 per cent), closely followed by recruitment from inside the ministerial bureaucracy (43.6 per cent), while political officeholders make up a minority of 8.6 per cent of all appointees. The table suggests that there are differences between Hungary and Western Europe with respect to the career origin of State Secretaries, but these differences are not dramatic. It is not unusual to find the recruitment of outsiders in countries like Germany and France, but the proportion of outsiders is much lower in these countries in that the majority of new appointees come from the ministerial bureaucracy (Derlien 1988; Rouban

Table 7. Last position/job of State Secretaries prior to appointment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Antall</th>
<th></th>
<th>Horn</th>
<th></th>
<th>Orbán*</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Insiders</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal promotion</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lateral promotion</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demotion</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insiders total</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outsiders</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-political background</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outsiders total</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partisans</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political background</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career path known</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * If one of the groups is over-represented in the Orbán sample, then it is most likely the group of insiders because State Secretaries who were promoted, transferred or demoted were easiest to identify.
The Western European country that comes closest to the Hungarian pattern is Spain, where the last position of top officials displays striking similarities between the Horn and the Orbán Governments, on the one hand, and the Gonzales and the Aznar Governments, on the other (Parrado-Díez 2004: 252).13

Table 7 also indicates that, over time, the recruitment of ministerial civil servants declined, while the recruitment of outsiders to State Secretary ranks rose. The group of State Secretaries recruited from the ministries shrank by approximately a half, from more than 50 per cent during the Antall Government to just 25 per cent during the Orbán Government. Conversely, the group of outside recruits almost doubled from 39 to 64 per cent. At the same time, the proportion of State Secretaries with a political background remained more or less stable between 7 and 11 per cent in the 1990s. Table 7 therefore suggests a trend from a mode of bounded politicisation during the Antall Government towards a mode of open politicisation during the Orbán Government with the Horn Government falling between these two modes. This conclusion does, however, require qualification. The strategy to examine State Secretaries’ career pathways by recording their last job has the advantage that it is relatively accurate given the general problem of identifying the extent and nature of political influence over senior civil service appointments. When measuring the last job of State Secretaries, three categories were used:

- ‘Insiders’ include all State Secretaries who were recruited from the ministerial bureaucracy – that is they were formally promoted within the same ministry, promoted from one ministry to another, transferred to another ministry or demoted from an Administrative to a Deputy State Secretary position.
- ‘Outsiders’ refer to State Secretaries who are formally new to the ministerial bureaucracy and who held a position in a non-political setting prior to their appointment, including state administrative agencies outside the core structure of the ministries, research institutions (in particular universities), the private sector and a residual category of other backgrounds such as the Constitutional Court, nongovernmental and international organisations.
- ‘Partisans’ are State Secretaries with a political background. They form a separate group of State Secretaries brought in from outside the ministerial bureaucracy, including State Secretaries whose last job belonged to the political executive (e.g., as Political State Secretary), who were originally elected Members of Parliament, and officials of the parties forming the government coalition. In addition, partisan recruits cover State Secretaries who, according to their curriculum vitae or statements of the
appointing Ministers made in personal interviews, could be identified as party activists (e.g., State Secretaries who worked for a party committee or who were actively involved in the preparation of party programmes and the conduct of electoral campaigns).\textsuperscript{14}

This assessment strategy can serve as a first indicator to distinguish State Secretaries’ career backgrounds. However, this measurement provides a conservative estimate of the potential political connections of State Secretaries’ career pathways because it does not capture their longer-term career history and hence potential connections to political parties at an earlier or later stage of their careers. For instance, a State Secretary who is recruited from the ministerial bureaucracy and is therefore counted as an ‘insider’ may have only joined a ministry when the new governing parties took office, being initially appointed as a senior civil servant and shortly afterwards being promoted to a State Secretary position. Moreover, State Secretaries who are nominally counted as ‘outsiders’ may in reality be experienced officials because they worked in the ministries at an earlier stage of their careers. These officials may have pursued careers in the ministerial bureaucracy, taken a job at a public administration agency and returned after some time to the ministries. This type of mobile State Secretary still shares most features of a career civil servant, but in the Hungarian case this group of officials is small. Instead, in Hungary, it is more common to find State Secretaries who come and go with a particular political party or bloc of parties. This type of commuter or returnee includes university teachers or private-sector managers who joined the ministries when a particular bloc of parties formed the government, left the ministries for a university or the private sector when the party was voted out of office, and returned to a State Secretary rank when their party or their bloc of parties returned to government. In addition, there are many cases where career officials were (willingly) converted into a kind of partisan commuter. They originally pursued a career in the ministries, were promoted to the senior ranks by the governing parties of the day, left the ministries with what had become their party, spent the opposition period at a university, the private sector, a political party or other settings, and returned to a State Secretary post when their party was voted back into government. It would be misleading to refer to these officials as ‘career officials’ or ‘outsiders’ because this type of bureaucratic career is tightly controlled by and dependent upon a particular party and can therefore rather be taken to indicate a mode of partisan politicisation.

Tables 8 through 10 (for Tables 9 and 10, see the Appendix) and Figure 1 take into account the longer-term career histories of the State Secretaries that were appointed between 1990 and the end of 2000.\textsuperscript{15} They distinguish:
Table 8. Career pathways of State Secretaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Antall</th>
<th>Horn</th>
<th>Orbán*</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genuine insiders</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genuine outsiders</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisans</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career path known</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *To the extent that the Orbán sample is biased, Tables 8 through 10 may overestimate the proportions for genuine insiders and returnees because they were generally easier to identify than the other two groups. Given that partisan appointees are likely to be underestimated, returnees and partisan appointees are still very likely to make up the largest (combined) group of appointees.

Figure 1. Career pathways of new state secretaries.
• ‘Genuine insiders’ as career officials who already held a position in the ministerial bureaucracy at the time a new government was formed. These officials are in one way or another inherited State Secretaries, senior or higher civil servants who were promoted or transferred by the new government.

• ‘Genuine outsiders’ as State Secretaries who never held a position in the ministerial bureaucracy at the time the new government was formed.

• ‘Returnees’ as State Secretaries who did not hold a position in the ministerial bureaucracy at the time a new government was formed, but who already held a position in the ministries at an earlier stage of their careers when the same party or bloc of parties formed a government.

• ‘Partisans’ who are equivalent to the group of partisans counted in Table 7. They are reported as a separate category in Tables 8 through 10 to distinguish them more clearly from returnees. However, because the careers of both political recruits and returnees are heavily dependent on a particular political party, together these two categories are assumed to represent evidence for a partisan mode of politicisation. Correspondingly, Figure 1 summarises the evolution of the mode of politicisation with respect to the first (I) and second (II) generation of both Administrative (ASS) and Deputy State Secretaries (DSS) in post-communist Hungary until the end of 2000.

Tables 8 to 10 and Figure 1 indicate an overall shift from a mode of bounded politicisation during the early days of the Antall Government to a mode of partisan politicisation since 1994 when the Horn Government took office. First, the tables show that when the Antall Government took office in May 1990, it recruited most State Secretaries from the ministerial bureaucracy. In accordance with the general impression that could be gained in personal interviews, politically motivated appointments to State Secretary ranks were an exception among the first generation of Antall’s State Secretaries. Moreover, the Antall Government could not rely on the recruitment of experienced returnees to fill the vacancies left by the top officials of the Németh Government because it was the first post-communist government formed by a centre-right coalition. Instead, the Antall Government is usually ‘praised’ by politicians, civil servants and outside commentators for initially having tried to establish and preserve a separation between a professional civil service that included Administrative and Deputy State Secretaries and a political realm including the members of the Government and Political State Secretaries. After taking office in 1990, the Antall Government therefore followed a mode of bounded politicisation that looks familiar to students of the German or French senior civil services where changes of government produce a shake-up
of the ministerial bureaucracy, but senior posts remain reserved for the second tier of senior civil servants who gain a promotion after a change of government (Goetz 1999; Rouban 1999).

Second, the politicisation of Antall’s second generation of appointees can be classified as a mode of open politicisation. However, the subsequent shift towards a partisan mode of politicisation can be traced to the second generation of State Secretaries recruited by the Antall Government. When many first-generation State Secretaries left or were forced to leave the ministries, the Antall Government recruited most new State Secretaries from outside the ministries and promoted officials who had only joined the ministerial bureaucracy after the Antall Government took office. As the 1994 elections approached, the Antall Government also increasingly appointed State Secretaries who had some kind of political background such as Members of Parliament and party activists. As a consequence, the senior bureaucracy changed face almost completely between 1990 and 1994 in that, at the eve of the 1994 elections, two-thirds of all State Secretaries had not worked in the ministries before 1990.17

Third, the partisan politicisation of the State Secretary ranks became the prevailing mode of politicisation when the communist successor party, MSZP, returned to government in 1994, forming a coalition with the liberal SZDSZ. The most striking feature of the recruitment strategy of the Horn Government is the return of State Secretaries who were in senior ranks during the Németh Government. Before their appointment in 1994, these ‘new’ State Secretaries did not work in official posts at one of the governing parties, but their career background inevitably associates them with the governing parties. Most of the Administrative State Secretaries, for instance, left the ministries in 1990 or shortly after to work outside the ministerial bureaucracy, largely in the private sector.18 In particular, MSZP ministries were staffed with returnees. By contrast, the ministries headed by the junior coalition partner, SZDSZ, saw a larger influx of outsiders than returnees to State Secretary posts, but this finding should be unsurprising when bearing in mind that the SZDSZ had no experience in government prior to 1994 and therefore had fewer possibilities to appoint returnees.

Fourth, the second centre-right government that took office in 1998 reproduced a mode of partisan politicisation similar to the Horn Government. Following the large shake-out in the State Secretary ranks in the summer and autumn of 1998, the Orbán Government recruited new State Secretaries from outside the ministries, those who unambiguously had some kind of political background as well as a considerable proportion who had served a government of the same political stripe: the centre-right government led by Prime Minister Antall. Most of the returning State Secretaries belonged to Antall’s second
generation of appointees. They bridged the period between 1994 and 1998 in diverse settings including academia, the private sector and, in a few cases, administrative agencies outside the ministries. Especially, Orbán’s Administrative State Secretaries either gathered experience in the ministries during the Antall Government or held some kind of political office before their appointment – for instance, as Political State Secretary, senior party official or candidate of one of the governing parties at the parliamentary elections of 1998.19

The tables do not report the impact of the 2002 change of government on the composition of the Hungarian senior civil service, but personnel policy displayed very familiar features after the investiture of the Medgyessy Government. First, the large majority of State Secretaries inherited from the Orbán Government were replaced within a short time after the change of government. Second, the largest group of new appointees were recruited from outside the ministerial bureaucracy. Third, many of the new appointees were already appointed to State Secretary or other senior positions during the Horn years or even the Németh and Horn years, they were replaced by the Orbán Government and returned in 2002 with the MSZP/SZDSZ coalition. After 2002, the tendency for State Secretaries to return after bridging several years in academia or the private sector also applied to the SZDSZ ministries. Fourth, a considerable proportion of State Secretaries with a political career background were recruited into the top ranks of the ministries. For instance, several new State Secretaries had worked for one of the governing parties in various functions, which suggests that, in comparison to the 1990s, it has become more common for returning State Secretaries to bridge the out-of-office period at a political party.20 The recent developments therefore suggest a stabilisation of a mode of partisan politicisation in post-communist Hungary.

The extent to which the confirmation of the socialist-liberal government in the 2006 elections will break this pattern of periodically changing the colours of the senior ranks of the administration remains to be seen. Somewhat surprisingly, a considerable proportion of officials (even if much smaller than in previous election years) were changed and a new generation of officials has started to populate the senior ranks of the administration. These officials tend to come from the private sector, have often long been in contact with the governing parties, especially the MSZP, and many of them are in fact very young, which suggests that the next generation of returnees might currently be in the making.

Conclusion

The emergence of a mode of partisan politicisation in Hungary supports the argument that the politicisation of senior civil services in post-communist
Europe differs from the prevailing Western modes of politicisation. The politicisation of Hungarian State Secretaries does not perfectly match a mode of partisan politicisation. A partisan mode of politicisation assumes that changes of government lead to high turnover in the senior civil service and the appointment of officials whose careers are connected to the world of politics in that they have been political officeholders of some sort before embarking on what is at least nominally a bureaucratic career. In Hungary, the politicisation of State Secretaries is indeed characterised by high turnover and governments have also appointed former political and partisan officials to State Secretary positions. However, the distinguishing feature of politicisation in Hungary is high turnover in combination with the appointment of officials who come and go with their bloc of political parties while bridging the out-of-office period in the private sector, academia or at a political party. By appointing a large proportion of returnees, governing parties reveal that they prefer to rely on officials who have a proven track record of having served a government formed by parties of the same political stripe. The careers of these State Secretaries are tightly coupled to the electoral success and ability of ‘their’ political parties to form and sustain a government. It is therefore justified to conclude that the approach of governing parties to the political control of the top of the Hungarian senior civil service comes closest to a mode of partisan politicisation.

The literature on politician-bureaucrat relations suggests that both a ‘pure’ and a ‘light’ mode of partisan politicisation are untypical in Western democracies. Turnover after changes of government is high in many countries of Western Europe, but it is untypical for governments to opt for the appointment of returnees to senior civil service ranks.21 In order to search for broad similarities, one has to travel either across the Atlantic to the American bureaucracy or back in time to the communist past: two very strange bedfellows indeed. The literature on political appointees in the United States suggests a mode of open politicisation, which combines high turnover in the senior ranks of the administration with the recruitment of outsiders from non-political settings. Peters (2004: 129) has argued that one of the expressions of increasing politicisation in the United States concerns the rise of ‘experts [who] will move in and out of government several times in the course of their career’. In other words, the phenomenon of the returning senior official has become more important for the American bureaucracy, suggesting that State Secretaries in Hungary have more in common with American political appointees than with most senior officials in Western Europe.22 Otherwise, the governance of Hungarian State Secretaries shares more features with the communist past than with the prevailing modes of politicisation in Western Europe. The tight dependence of bureaucratic careers on the ruling party and the interweaving of individual career paths in politics, the state bureaucracy and the economy were
hallmarks of bureaucratic career patterns during the communist regime. The governance of the senior bureaucracy does therefore seem to have undergone a process of adaptation from the communist regime to democratic conditions, with the difference being that in contrast to the communist one-party state, the post-communist state changes its political colour every few years.

Several questions arise from this conclusion. First, to what extent is this approach to political control limited to the senior ranks of the ministerial bureaucracy in Hungary? Recent research on Hungarian politics argues that governments have tended to pursue ‘winner-takes-all strategies’ with respect to the meso-level of governance more generally in that they have sought to maximise political control over the re-organisation of the systems of central and territorial governance, the system of interest intermediation and the public media (Ágh 2001; Körösenyi 1999). Clearly, the partisan politicisation of the senior civil service fits the general picture of governments pursuing winner-takes-all strategies vis-à-vis the meso-level of governance. This suggests that the adaptation of communist modes of governance to democratic conditions is relevant beyond the governance of the senior civil service in the ministerial bureaucracy.

Second, this article has been able to identify Hungary as a case of senior civil service politicisation that differs from Western modes of politicisation. However, it is a matter of future research to examine the extent to which this post-communist trajectory of politicisation is a specifically Hungarian development. The literature on post-communist public administration suggests that senior civil services generally have been subject to instability and politicisation (Verheijen 2001). While very little comparable data are available on the turnover and especially the career pathways of senior officials, the general evidence indicates that countries such as Poland, Bulgaria and Romania have experienced similar trajectories of senior civil service politicisation (Verheijen 1999; Zubek 2005). By contrast, first research on countries such as Estonia and Latvia indicates that frequent changes of government do not necessarily lead to the replacement of senior officials by new governments (Reinholde 2003; Sikk 2006). In other words, the modes of senior civil service politicisation in Central and Eastern Europe are likely to exhibit a good deal of variation – a picture that is indeed familiar from Western democracies – but it can be expected that the emergence of a mode of partisan politicisation is not a uniquely Hungarian development.

Future research will also have to examine the driving forces behind the emergence of a mode of partisan politicisation in Hungary and, as is likely, in other countries, even if several puzzling points are quickly becoming apparent. First, the Hungarian trajectory challenges explanations that stress the presence of a ‘critical opposition’ as the crucial factor inhibiting the ‘politicisation of the
post-communist state’ (Grzymala-Busse 2003). In Hungary, the mode of partisan politicisation has been remarkably stable since the second parliamentary elections of 1994. The rise of the partisan mode of politicisation broadly coincides with the rise of a critical opposition in the form of a polarised party competition between the MSZP and the SZDSZ, on the one side, and the Fidesz and its centre-right allies, on the other. The findings of this article therefore support the argument that the structure of political competition is central to the explanation of state politicisation in post-communist Europe. Yet, the Hungarian case suggests that the polarisation of party competition between ex-communist and anti-communist political camps combined with regular and wholesale changes of government contributes to the politicisation of the senior civil service rather than vice versa.23

Second, these findings cast some doubt on the argument that the (prospect of) accession to the European Union (EU) has had a de-politicising effect on post-communist civil services (Dimitrova 2005). The establishment of a professional and de-politicised civil service was a condition for accession to the EU and it is conventionally considered a precondition for the successful implementation of the acquis communautaire. In Hungary, by contrast, the senior civil service has been first re-politicised and then the politicisation has stabilised at a high and intense level, raising questions with respect to the effectiveness of EU conditionality and the assumption that civil service politicisation undermines the implementation capacity of new Member States. Research on the Europeanisation of public administration in Central and Eastern Europe has, however, also identified the emergence of technocratic and less politicised ‘islands of excellence’ in areas such as budgetary policy and EU affairs (Dimitrov et al. 2006; Ágh 2002, 2003). While this article has not put these claims to a test, the four modes of politicisation provide the conceptual toolkit for such an assessment and thus the possibility to specify the impact of the EU in the area of civil service governance in the new Member States.

Finally, Hungary is generally ranked in the group of successful democratisers and marketisers in post-communist Europe. The Hungarian record of politicisation therefore does not easily fit the widely held assumption that the existence of a ‘usable state apparatus’ and the ‘Weberianness of core state agencies’ – both conceptualised as a professional and de-politicised civil service is a prerequisite for the success of democratisation and marketisation processes in transitional and developing countries (Amsden et al. 1994; Evans & Rauch 1999; Linz & Stepan 1996). These studies concentrate on senior and higher civil servants and emphasise the positive effect of ‘meritocratic recruitment’ and ‘predictable, long-term career ladders’ comparable to a mode of de facto non-politicisation on the prospects of democratic consolidation and economic growth. By contrast, the politicisation of the civil service is argued to
undermine the development of state capacity in transition and developing countries. Against this perspective, the Hungarian mode of politicisation with its far-reaching reliance on the recruitment of returnees raises the possibility that the negative consequences of politicisation can be contained, at least insofar as the competence of senior civil servants in policy making, coordination and implementation is concerned. The evolution of the post-communist state undoubtedly deserves further investigation in that it raises the prospect of challenging a number of conventionally held views in the areas of comparative public administration, comparative politics and comparative Europeanisation research.

**Acknowledgements**

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**Appendix**

*Table 9. Career pathways of Administrative State Secretaries*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Antall</th>
<th>Horn</th>
<th>Orbán</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First generation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genuine insiders</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genuine outsiders</td>
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<td>15.4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisans</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career path known</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second generation</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Genuine insiders</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genuine outsiders</td>
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<td>35.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisans</td>
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<td>7.1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes

1. Page & Wright (1999) advance a third ‘approach to the political control of the senior civil service’ for countries such as Greece and Spain, which they similarly label ‘partisan control’. The main difference to the commanding heights approach lies in the depth of politicisation: it reaches further down the ministerial hierarchy, but not necessarily a change in the career patterns of senior officials. Therefore, I reserve the label ‘partisan politicisation’ for the recruitment of senior officials with a particular kind of career background.

2. Admittedly, it may be problematic to classify these countries in the same category. However, here I follow Page & Wright (1999) who differentiate them with respect to the depth of politicisation, but not when considering the career origin of senior officials (see also Note 1 above).

3. The present classificatory approach therefore has the advantage of keeping the number of categories manageable (rather than examining the politicisation in post-communist Europe against a potentially large number of existing modes of politicisation). In particular, it seeks to strike a balance between the breadth and differentiation of categories (cf. Gerring 2001: 40). On the one hand, the defining attributes chosen for individual modes of politicisation are broad enough to accommodate the many Western modes of politicisation and thus to identify similarities with post-communist senior civil services. On the other, the attributes are sufficiently differentiated to distinguish clearly a new mode of politicisation that differs from Western traditions.
4. E.g., such a finding would question the argument that the politicisation of the senior civil service in the United States is the result of a presidential system of government, in which the potential for conflict between the President and Congress creates pressures for politicisation (e.g., Moe & Caldwell 1994). While this argument is plausible when comparing the American presidential system to Western European parliamentary systems, the finding of an even broadly similar mode of politicisation in Central and Eastern Europe would suggest that the relations between executive and legislature are secondary when it comes to the explanation of modes of senior civil service politicisation (see also the Conclusion).

5. From 1990–1997, the Temporary Act on State Secretaries governed the appointment and dismissal of State Secretaries. In 1997, the Act was replaced by the Act on the Legal Status of Members of the Government and State Secretaries, which was significantly amended in 2006.

6. In the 1990 Act and its 1997 successor, both Administrative and Deputy State Secretaries are defined as professional, permanent civil servants below the Minister as head of the ministerial organisation and a Political State Secretary who assists the Minister in the political leadership of the Ministry. The 2006 reform merged the position of Political State Secretary and Administrative State Secretary into one Senior State Secretary and transformed the position of Deputy State Secretary into the position of Specialist State Secretary. Both positions are now recognised as political appointees in that their appointment is tied to the tenure of the government. Ministers can further exercise wide discretion over the composition of their political cabinets and the appointment and dismissal of senior civil servants below the State Secretary ranks within the ministries, Heads of Departments, their Deputies and Heads of Divisions.

7. Fricz (2004) reaches a similar conclusion in that he dates the re-emergence of high degree of politicisation back to the 1994 change of government.

8. The 2006 reform of the State Secretary ranks therefore effectively reversed the institutional change that was introduced in 1990.

9. All State Secretaries whose appointment was formally revoked were counted as ‘replaced’. However, 14% of the State Secretaries who were counted as ‘replaced’ did not leave the ministerial bureaucracy, but were re-assigned to other positions in the ministries as State Secretaries following a promotion, transfer or demotion (see also Table 7).

10. In contrast to Germany and Spain, comparable data reveal Denmark as a Western European case with low turnover rates among senior civil servants shortly after changes of government (Christensen 2004).

11. The period of six months was also chosen for pragmatic reasons as the Orbán Government established a new Ministry of Youth and Sports in January 1999, six months after the investiture of the government, and the first State Secretaries of this ministry are therefore included in the first generation of appointees.

12. In particular, the Antall Government replaced almost 60% of all first generation State Secretaries and almost 30% of all second generation ones before the second elections of 1994 (see also below). By contrast, the turnover among first generation State Secretaries was lower for both the Horn and the Orbán governments in that approximately 50% of the State Secretaries were replaced by the government to which they also owed their appointment.

13. Parrado-Díez (2004) distinguishes officials recruited from 19 different sectors, which are further grouped into ‘public administration’, the ‘private sector’ and ‘politics’. The simi-
larities therefore arise as a result of a grouping of sectors in accordance with Table 7. This also implies that Parrado-Díez would classify Spain as a mode of open politicisation.

14. This measurement is likely to underestimate the proportion of ‘partisans’ because the interviews covered only a sample of ‘appointing Ministers’ and hence could only check for a sample of appointed State Secretaries whether or not they were reported and confirmed as party activists.

15. Admittedly, these ‘longer-term career histories’ provide an incomplete picture of an official’s lifelong career. However, in the present context, the notion of a ‘longer-term career’ path is distinguished from a career as the ‘last job before an appointment’ (see Table 7). More important, it seeks to capture and emphasise the stages of an official’s career that are crucial for an attempt to further qualify the connection between State Secretaries and governing parties.

16. The Antall Government recruited a few State Secretaries from administrative agencies and research institutes in the wider periphery of the ministries who had gained experience in the ministries during the 1980s. These officials are here counted as insiders.

17. A similar argument is advanced by studies of elites in post-communist Hungary, which emphasise the large degree of elite circulation in politics and the administration during the first few years after the change of regime (Szelényi et al. 1995).

18. Although Tables 8 to 10 show that the proportion of returnees was lower for the first generation of Deputy State Secretaries and for the second generation of State Secretaries, overall the recruitment of State Secretaries from the ministerial civil service remained a far less common path to the top during the Horn Government than the appointment of outsiders and returnees.

19. Tables 9 and 10 show that during the Orbán Government genuine outsiders became the single largest group of State Secretaries. However, returnees and (the rise in the proportion of) partisans together make up a larger group and hence the classification of the overall mode of politicisation as partisan during the Orbán Government is justified.

20. The aftermath of the 2002 change of government also points to an increasing number of cases that were appointed to State Secretary positions during the Horn and/or Németh governments and who did not return as State Secretary, but as Political State Secretary or Minister. Examples include the first two Ministers of Finance, László and Draskovics; the first Minister heading the Prime Minister’s Office, Kiss; and the second Minister of Foreign Affairs, Somógyi. All four were in State Secretary ranks during the Horn Government and returned as MSZP nominees in 2002 or thereafter.

21. This conclusion also applies to the Spanish case. The long period of 14 years between two changes of government in 1982 and 1996 is likely to have prevented the appointment of many returnees in 1996. However, the return of the Socialists to government in 2004 after eight years in opposition might have paved the way for the influx of many known faces to the Spanish senior bureaucracy. There therefore are good grounds to further compare the politicisation of senior civil services in Southern Europe and Central and Eastern Europe (Goetz 2001).

22. Peters’ (2004) argument suggests that the inclusion of a distinct mode of politicisation that captures the political control of the senior civil service by means of appointing returnees may be a useful strategy to extend the classification and further specify the distinction between a mode of open politicisation and a mode of partisan politicisation.

23. An application of this argument to other Central and Eastern European countries is beyond the scope of this article. However, the polarisation of party competition in
countries such as Poland and Bulgaria neatly fits the argument advanced here. Conversely, the argument suggests that the absence of political polarisation between ex-communist and anti-communist forces in countries such as Estonia and Latvia has mitigated pressures to politicise the senior civil service in the ministerial bureaucracy.

24. The negative consequences of politicisation for the competence level of the civil service are probably more discernible below the very senior ranks because higher and middle ranking civil servants have no incentive to gain promotion unless they are willing to commit politically to one of the ideological camps.

References


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